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REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ANTITRUST LAws-EXEMPTION OF AGRICUL-
TURAL COOPERATIVES-Defendant agricultural cooperative, organized under 
the authority of section 6 of the Clayton Act1 and section I of the Cap-
per-Volstead Act,2 engaged in alleged predatory practices claimed by the 
government to constitute an attempt to monopolize and lessen competition 
within the ban of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In a civil action by the 
government setting forth three separate claims for relief from such ac-
tivities, 3 held, the first cause of action, alleging monopoly, dismissed on the 
merits. In the absence of a combination or conspiracy with persons who are 
not within the purview of the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts, the busi-
ness activities of an agricultural cooperative are exempt from action under 
the antitrust laws.4 United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Pro-
ducers Assn., (D.C. D.C. 1958) 167 F. Supp. 45. But in a treble-damage ac-
tion based on similar facts/' on defendant-cooperative's motion for sum-
mary judgment, held, motion denied. The grants of certain exemptions to 
agricultural cooperatives do not make predatory practices aimed at mon-
opoly lawful, nor do they preclude a person injured by such practices from 
bringing a private suit. April v. National Cranberry Assn., (D.C. Mass. 
1958) 168 F. Supp. 919. 
These decisions each make a basic assumption, supported by both dicta6 
and writers,7 that the enjoyment of a monopoly by an agricultural cooper-
ative is not illegal in itself. This assumption is based on the policy enunci-
ated by the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts of aiding individual farmers 
by allowing a narrowing of competition in the marketing of agricultural 
1 "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence 
and operation of . . . agricultural . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of 
mutual help ... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from 
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade .... " 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §17. 
2 "Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products ... may act together 
in associations . . . in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and 
marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged. 
Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such associations and 
their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such 
purposes .... " 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §291. 
3 Under 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4, giving the federal govern-
ment injunctive relief against violations of the Sherman Act. 
4 The second and third causes of action alleged combination and other illegal 
activity wit'h non-exempt organizations and were thus recognized as valid. 
5 Under 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15, allowing treble damage relief to 
a person " ... injured in his business or property ,by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws .•.. " 
6 See, e.g., United States v. duPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 at 388 (1956); Cape Cod Food 
Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Assn., (D.C. Mass. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 900 at 907. 
7 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAws 311 (1955); HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS 220 
(1942). See generally, note, 44 VA. L. R.Ev. 63 at 82-84 (1958). 
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products.8 It is only the legality of the means used to achieve these per-
missive monopolies that is being questioned in the principal cases. The 
issue, which produced conflicting results in these cases,9 may be resolved 
into two basic questions. Are only those steps involving voluntary member-
ship and voluntary marketing agreements exempt under the statutes?10 
Or are all practices carried on by a cooperative alone, even if they are 
predatory and illegal if engaged in by other businesses, exempt from pri-
vate or governmental action?11 The futility of attempting to ferret out an 
explicit congressional intent on the narrow issue before the courts is demon-
strated by the conflicting excerpts from the records offered in both cases 
in support of their holdings.12 A reading together of the applicable 
statutes, with a view to the nature of the American agricultural economy, 
shows the purposes of the grants of exemption. From this the proper limita-
tions of that exemption can be deduced. To overcome the disadvantages of 
individual marketing, cooperative marketing was to be allowed in the face 
of the antitrust provisions that would make such combinations illegal. 
And in the absence of an undue enhancement of prices a monopoly re-
sulting from natural economic factors was to be allowed without govern-
s See Koller, "Cooperatives in a Capitalistic Economy," AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
COOPERATION 27 (Dec. 1947); HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS 215 
(1942). 
9 The conflict of opinion in the two principal cases is not without precedent. In 
United States v. King, (D.C. Mass. 1916) 250 F. 908, it was stated that even if the de-
fendants in that case qualified as a Clayton Act cooperative, the alleged blacklisting and 
secondary boycotts would not fall within the act's exemptions. This dictum was rejected 
in United States v. Dairy Cooperative Assn., (D.C. Ore. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 475, which 
held that the statutes conferred on farm cooperatives blanket exemption from antitrust 
restrictions. 
10 See Cape Cod Food Products, Inc. v. National Cranberry Assn., note 6 supra, 
dicta at 907; United States v. King, note 9 supra, dicta at 910; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 311 (1955); Hanna, 
"Antitrust Immunities of Cooperative Associations," 13 LAw & CoNTE11r. PROB. 488 at 
499 (1948); Packel, THE LAW OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERATIVES 196 
(1940). 
11 See United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 145 
F. Supp. 151 at 153-154; United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Assn., 
(D.C. D.C. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 681 (dicta); United States v. Dairy Cooperative Assn., note 
9 supra. The Supreme Court has held that the exemption does not extend to agreements 
in restraint of trade entered into between a cooperative and a person not a producer 
or cooperative. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). Referring •to •that portion 
of the Capper-Volstead Act allowing the secretary of agriculture to seek an injunction 
if the restraint or monopoly results :in an en'hancement of prices [42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 
U.S.C. (1952) §292], the Court stated at 206: "That this provision ... does not cover the 
entire field of the Sherman Act is sufficiently clear. . . . The Sherman Act hits at 
attempts to monopolize as well as actual monopolization." But this decision was limited 
to its facts by the district court in United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, 
this note supra, which 'held that the exemption does extend to a conspiracy ,between two 
cooperatives for the purpose of fixing prices. 
12 See the principal cases: United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers 
Assn. at 51; April v. National Cranberry Assn. at 921-923. 
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mental restraint.13 Since the purpose of the acts was to place farmers in 
a bargaining position comparable to that enjoyed by corporate industrial 
enterprises,14 it is difficult to conceive of any public policy or economic con-
siderations that would extend protection to cooperative activities of a 
predatory nature, when such activities if carried on by a corporation would 
be illegal. But as evidenced by the paucity of relevant cases and the usually 
good-faith activities of cooperatives, the problem presented does not yet 
appear to be a major one. Nevertheless, with the growing membership and 
power of these organizations15 and the ensuing control of increased por-
tions of the national food supply in fewer marketing agencies, courts should 
not be reluctant to take a position, based on a reasonable interpretation of 
the statutes, against the predatory practices of the cooperatives. If the 
courts are unwilling to do so, the responsibility will fall on Congress to 
heed the advice of experts in the field to clarify the scope of exemptions 
afforded the activities of farm cooperatives.16 
Dean L. Berry, S.Ed. 
13 See 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. (1952) §292. Areas in which natural economic 
factors would be most likely ,to allow cooperative monopoly would be in produce having 
only a limited growing area (e.g., cranberries) or, because of perishability, only a limited 
marketing area (e.g., milk). 
14 See United States v. duPont & Co., note 6 supra, dicta at 388; ·wmTNEY, ANTITRUST 
POLICIES 426 (1958). Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, dicta at 145-146 (1940). 
15 Co-ops have increased their membership from 2,700,000 in the late 1920's to 
7,700,000 in 1958; N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1958, p. 14:5. See also the commentary on the 
Maryland and Virginia case in "Spilled Milk," NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 1958, p. 4. 
16 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAws 311 (1955); Wood, "The Report of the Attorney General's Antitrust 
Committee Three Years After," 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 669 at 678-682 (1958); Oppenheim, 
"Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 
50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1210-1213 (1952). 
